Some new thoughts on the “can you make losses printing money” theme, this time with a Hans-Werner Sinn angle.
The situation in Greece continues to tick over. An explanation of the ECB’s decision tonight to cut off various Greek assets from its eligible collateral list.
It’s complicated. But it’s got nothing to do with technocratic ECB rules.
My thoughts on the ECB’s QE announcement. Perhaps a bit long, perhaps a bit disorganised ….
Everyone knows German savers are special, don’t they? Not so much it turns out. Read here.
Imagine you’re a smart young rich kid. You invent a money-printing machine. You use it to magic up money to buy $100 in assets. It turns out, though, you didn’t make a great investment and the assets end up being worth only $90.
Do you (a) Be grateful that you’re $90 better off or (b) Call up your Dad to tell him you need $10 to make up your losses?
The debate about potential ECB asset purchases continues to focus incessantly on the issues surrounding potential losses, with the ECB playing the role of the rich kid asking his Dad for an unnecessary bailout.
Take this from my old mate Hans Werner Sinn (via Constantin Gurdgiev).
Aaaand Sinn is baaack… pic.twitter.com/Udldwp8Xev
— Constantin Gurdgiev (@GTCost) October 2, 2014
Apparently tax-payers will have to make up for a shortfall of profits from the ECB if there are losses on ABS purchases. In saying the ECB will have reduced profits, Sinn focuses solely on losing the $10 and forgets about the $90 profit.
One could question whether money creation by the Eurosystem is really just pure profit. Doesn’t this expand the supply of liquidity to the banking system, increasing the amount of money on deposit with ECB and thus increase the interest payments it has to make to banks? Not now – the ECB currently charges banks to keep money on deposit with it so this factor now actually raises the profitability of money creation. (Interest on reserves is also not a necessary feature of a central bank operational framework – the Fed managed fine without it for years.)
I think there are two reasons there is so much confusion about these issues.
The first is the arcane way that central banks do their accounting. All money that is created is counted as a “liability” even if, like bank notes, it doesn’t actually ever impose a cost. Central bank capital measures based on subtracting reported liabilities from reported assets thus grossly underestimate the true financial value generated by central banks. (See here for a more detailed discussion).
Central bank profit and loss measures are calculated in line with this wholly uneconomic methodology. In the analogy above, the central bank would report a $10 loss because its assets had increased by $90 while its “liabilities” had increased by $100. Reporting a loss in these circumstances doesn’t actually make any economic sense but is sure to generate lots of hand-wringing from people who imagine something terrible has happened.
The second problem is the widespread failure to understand that central banks are fundamentally different from commercial banks. Central banks do not need to have assets greater than liabilities and cannot “go bust” due to losses on asset purchases. That said, most of the international policy community seems happy to perpetuate this myth.
For example, consider this Very Serious report from the BIS last year. It recommends that central banks should maintain positive capital, not because they need to, but because the public might be confused about this stuff and so it’s best not to get them too concerned. A quick flavour of the thinking:
we have no doubts about the central banks that are currently shouldering extraordinary financial risks. But our confidence is based on an understanding of the special character of central banks that may not be shared by markets and others.
So if financial markets believed central bankers needed to wear Hawaiian shirts, would it be best to ditch the suits and start drinking pina coladas at press conferences?
There may be another case where an international policy organisation recommends an incorrect policy solely because private investors believe strongly the incorrect policy must be followed, but I can’t think of one offhand.
These points are not intended as a recommendation for central banks to purchases whatever assets just take their fancy. There is an important opportunity cost here. For example, the money could be distributed to the public by providing each person with a fixed amount of money. So it’s important that the purchases are made in a fair and transparent way using market prices.
The other cost usually cited is that money creation may lead to inflation. But in the case of the ECB’s ABS purchases, this is a feature not a bug. The whole point of the programme is to raise inflation back to the ECB’s target level. The fact that the programme also fits with the ECB’s secondary goal of supporting the general economic goals of the EU is welcome but not crucial.
Anyway, expect lots more of this stuff over the next few months as the widespread lack of understanding of central bank balance sheets continues to see irrelevancies held up as crucial economic principles.
I was in Brussels on Monday to present my latest briefing paper to the European Paliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs committee. The paper addresses issues related to inflation differentials in the euro area and argues that the ECB’s failure to meet its inflation target is significantly complicating the process of adjustment throughout the euro area.
After the briefing, I attended the committee’s “monetary dialogue” session with Mario Draghi. In this session, Draghi repeated a line that he has been using over the past few weeks about how monetary and fiscal policies cannot work unless countries implement a set of unspecified “structural reforms.” In light of these comments, I’ll repeat the last few paragraphs of my paper here.
As the ECB takes a more active role in battling the ongoing slump, Mario Draghi has intensified his rhetoric about structural reforms. The transcript of his September press conferences shows fifteen uses of this phrase. Draghi now says he has “concluded that there is no fiscal or monetary stimulus that will produce any effect without ambitious and important, strong, structural reforms.”
It is hard to find a logic (at least one based on macroeconomic theory as we know it) for this argument. It is certainly the case that potential output growth in the euro area is currently low and can be improved by various policy reforms. However, it is also true that there is currently a very large shortfall between aggregate demand and the current supply potential of the euro area economy, a shortfall summarised in an unemployment rate of over 11 percent. So there is room for fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost the economy, even without structural reforms. In addition, to the extent that we are worried about deflation, the initial impact of structural reforms that boosted the supply capacity of the euro area would be to further depress inflation.
My point here is not to argue against structural reforms. There are many such reforms that can have an important positive effect over the medium- and longer-run (though we know little about the magnitude of their potential impact). But it is important for the ECB to take responsibility for its crucial role in the shorter-term macroeconomic management of the euro area and ECB officials continually placing structural reforms at the heart of discussions of this issue is unhelpful.
Draghi has many very well-qualified economic advisers — one of the very best, Frank Smets, was sitting beside him at the monetary dialogue. Let’s hope they can pursuade him to abandon this unfortunate and unnecessary line of rhetoric.
The latest round of briefing papers for the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee’s monetary dialogue can be found here. Click on 14.07.2014. The papers discuss the strength of the euro and non-standard monetary policies. My paper is “The ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too Little Too Late?” Click here for a version without the nasty “Draft” watermark. The paper contrasts the ECB’s approach to monetary policy in recent years with the that of the Federal Reserve. It also discusses the actions taken at the June Governing Council meeting and addresses issues relating to potential future asset purchase programmes. The abstract for the paper is as follows:
The ECB has been slower to cut interest rates and to consider asset purchase programmes than the other major central banks even though the euro area economy has performed worse than its comparators. This failure to act has not stemmed directly from the ECB’s price stability mandate. Indeed, by not acting sufficiently strongly, the ECB is now failing to meet its own definition of price stability. The measures introduced at the ECB’s June Governing Council meeting will have only a modest positive effect on the euro area economy. Large asset purchase programmes – of both sovereign bonds and private asset-backed securities – are overdue.
The most important thing happening in the European economy over the next year is the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of large euro area banks. This process will involve an asset quality review, a supervisory risk assessment and a stress test followed by the requirement that banks be recapitalised to address weaknesses that are found. Yesterday, we got a preview from Ireland as to how this process might work and it wasn’t at all pretty. In fact, it was pretty shambolic.
Because Ireland’s banking sector played a major role in sending the country into an EU-IMF program, the troika decided that Ireland’s bank assessment should begin prior to the other countries. So yesterday, the three Irish banks involved in the European bank assessment announced that they had received the results of a “balance sheet assessment” of their accounts of June 2013 from the Central Bank of Ireland (the terminology in relation to the comprehensive assessment changed over the course of the year but this balance sheet assessment appears to be what the ECB now calls an “asset quality review”.)
The timing of these announcements now looks a bit awkward. Originally, the idea seemed to be to have the announcements take place just prior to the ECB’s process for other countries but the timeline on the ECB’s assessment has slipped. It will now review bank balance sheets as of December 31, 2013, so interpreted strictly the Irish banks will need another balance sheet assessment again early next year. This begs the question why the Central Bank of Ireland (and ECB, who must have been involved) bothered to release the assessment of the June 2013 books at all.
If the timing of the balance sheet assessment was bad, the handling of the announcements was far worse. As of yet, the Central Bank of Irelandhas made no statement whatsoever on the balance sheet assessments. (Here is its list of press releases.) Instead, the three banks involved all released their own statements with varying amounts of information disclosed.
Revealing the most information was Bank of Ireland. This bank released a sheet of information (“Schedule 1”) that looked like something provided to it by the Central Bank of Ireland. The sheet showed that the Central Bank believed capital was lower and risk-weighted assets higher than the bank’s own accounts showed.
Calculated according to the 2014 regulatory capital rules, the Central Bank believes Bank of Ireland had a common equity tier 1 capital ratio of 9.85% in June while the bank’s own accounting treatment showed a figure of 13.8%. This 9.8% is still above the 8% ratio that will be required by the ECB following next year’s exercise. However, it would be below the 10.5% requirement that the Central Bank of Ireland has itself set in recent years. By this year’s regulatory capital rules, the Central Bank views Bank of Ireland’s common equity tier 1 ratio as 10.6% which is just above this requirement.
Does this mean that Bank of Ireland’s capital ratio is about to be written down by four percentage points? The Central Bank is its regulator so you might imagine that this would be the case. However, Bank of Ireland’s statement contains a number of criticisms of the Central Bank’s calculations. Indeed, the bank “remains confident in its own methodologies, calculations and impairment provisions” and the statement merely says the results will “remain subject to ongoing engagement” with the Central Bank.
The Central Bank certainly has the powers to compel Bank of Ireland to raise capital on the basis of its own assessment and this may be what happens. But it is not clear to me whether Bank of Ireland will be forced to release year-end accounts calculated in line with the methodologies preferred by the Central Bank of Ireland.
All told, it’s hard to know what Bank of Ireland’s reported capital ratios will be in its next report. However, the fact that a stress test has to be done next year and that this exercise will involve further (yet to be determined) capital requirements suggests that the bank will probably need to raise more capital.
If things are a little unclear with respect to Bank of Ireland, the situation is clear as mud when it comes to the other two banks that made announcements yesterday.
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) put out a terse announcement unaccompanied by a Schedule 1 sheet. It stated
AIB has been advised of the findings of this review which it will consider in the preparation of the bank’s year end December 2013 provisions and financial statements.
Based on an initial assessment of the findings of the BSA, the Bank believes it continues to be well capitalised and in excess of minimum regulatory requirements.
You might be tempted to read that statement and conclude that AIB’s “Schedule 1” sheet showed that it was well-capitalised and did not need to raise new capital. I think that’s a bit optimistic. AsBill Clinton might say, it depends on what the meaning of “Bank” is.
Given that the “Bank” in question had to do “an initial assessment of the findings” to come up with the “belief” that it is well capitalised, then my interpretation is that the “Bank that believes” is AIB. (The capital B being an affectation the bank (all lower case) likes to use in press releases.)
So the bank (or Bank …) believes that it’s well-capitalised. Well good for them. But remember that Bank of Ireland also disagreed with the Central Bank and believe their own figures are better. So there’s a lot of subjective beliefs floating around here. Most likely, AIB’s Schedule 1 sheet shows that it requires more capital.
Then there’s the most tight-lipped of the three banks, Permanent TSB, who provided no figures and simply stated
Based on the communicated results the outcome confirms that the capital position of permanent tsb plc is above minimum regulatory requirements.
What this means depends upon whose notion of “minimum regulatory requirements” you’re thinking of. It could mean above the Central Bank of Ireland’s guidelines of 10.5% or it could mean above the current European CRD4 minimum common equity ratio of 3.5%. A cynic might suggest that if it was the former then the bank would have released the results. Perhaps modest PTSB (who describe themselves without using a single upper-case letter) are hiding a set of fantastic results. Perhaps not.
The Central Bank of Ireland and the ECB should remember that the purpose of this exercise is to bring clarity to bank balance sheets. Yesterday’s events achieved the exact opposite with people scratching their heads interpreting strangely-worded statements and wondering about the figures that were not reported.
The ECB needs to use yesterday’s events as a lesson. It would not be acceptable for this kind of shambles to be repeated whenever the first stage of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment is completed. Either all banks involved in the process reveal the details of their assessment or else the whole exercise should be conducted in secret. Allowing stronger banks to report results while we are left wondering about the weaker ones is a recipe for financial instability.
After years of turmoil, Europe seems to finally have a good news story. Ireland will be the first of country to exit a “troika” program and yesterday its government announced that it would not even be seeking a “precautionary” credit line from Europe’s bailout fund, the ESM. But is this quite the good news story that most people think it is? I’m not so sure. Indeed, I suspect yesterday’s announcement illustrates how political problems may undermine Mario Draghi’s plans to save the euro.
There is certainly some good economic news coming from Ireland. Targets laid down in the program for the budget deficit were met and while economic growth has been minimal and unemployment is high, employment is now growing again and a large stock of over €20 billion of cash has been built up via borrowings from financial markets and the troika. By the very low bar set by the recent economic performance of the euro area, Ireland is something of a success.
For these reasons, yesterday’s announcement that Ireland would not need a new bailout was not news. This has been known for some time. The news element here was the announcement that there would be no precautionary credit line. But is that actually good news?
Irish government politicians have been keen to claim that there is some good economic news in this announcement, that it “provides clarity” and “reduces uncertainty”. In fact, the opposite is the case.
A precautionary credit line is something that doesn’t have to be used. Anything that can be done without a precautionary credit line can also be done with one. However, without such a credit line, the Irish government run the risk of running out of funds and having to negotiate a new bailout or credit line under far less positive circumstances than currently prevail. This adds to the uncertainties facing Ireland in the coming year, particularly given the possibility that Irish banks may need further recapitalisation next year.
Ireland’s finance minister, Michael Noonan, acknowledged yesterday that economic conditions may not be so benign next year. This should be seen as an argument for negotiating a credit line now but, strangely, Noonan used this observation as an argument for not seeking a credit line. He seemed to be struggling to find anything better than weak talking points to explain the benefits of not having a credit line.
There is, of course, a narrow political benefit to the Irish government from this “clean” exit, because it allows them to triumph about the full restoration of “sovereignty.” However, I don’t think they are so cynical as to have made this decision purely for that populist reason. Instead, my assessment is that the precautionary credit line could not be arranged now because it was politically impossible and that the Irish government are merely putting a brave face on what is a bad outcome.
The political problem is that credit lines from ESM require the approval of all euro area member states and this was not going to be possible now. Germany still does not have a government as Angela Merkel’s CDU continue negotiations with the SPD to form a coalition. During these negotiations, the SPD has regularly insisted that they would not support an ESM credit line for Ireland unless the country followed a series of highly specific policy recommendations.
SPD requirements for approval of a credit line included raising the corporate tax rate and introducing a financial transaction tax. The SPD also ruled out any deal that involved used funds from the credit line to recapitalize banks.
This kind of micro-managing of other people’s economies was not what most people had expected ESM conditionality to look like. Given the existing raft of EU monitoring programs that exist (the six pack, the two pack, the macroeconomic imbalances) a sensible approach would be to require that a country seeking a credit line from ESM commit itself to meeting the recommendations on macroeconomic policy of the European Commission.
When Germany finally has a government and SPD politicians are firmly ensconced in ministerial Mercs, I suspect the desire to micro-manage Ireland’s affairs will recede. However, the damage may well be done. Having sold the Irish public on the idea that the credit line was something to be avoided, it seems unlikely that the government can change its mind next Spring.
This is the odd aspect of yesterday’s decision. Why not announce that Ireland was exiting the program without a precautionary credit line but that discussions about this issue were ongoing? One unattractive possibility is that Ireland’s leaders were asked by their German colleagues to make this announcement to remove it as an issue in the government formation negotiations.
Missed in yesterday’s discussion is that these developments have implications for the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. This is the program announced by Mario Draghi after his “whatever it takes” speech last year. Under this program, the ECB can purchase unlimited quantities of a country’s government bonds. However, the ECB decided that countries could only avail of OMT if they had an agreement with ESM for a bailout program or precautionary credit line.
Ask yourself this: If star pupil Ireland couldn’t negotiate a precautionary credit line based on reasonable conditionality, what chance is there that a credit line of this sort for Italy will be approved by all countries in the euro area? OMT may have been cast as the plan to save the euro but getting it up and running may not be so easy.